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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY. 1"\1 
STATE OF GEORGIA Fik~D IN vFFICE 
DONALD AND DONNA GOLDSTEIN, ) [ 
Derivatively on behalf of Nominal) I . . MAR 1 3 2008 
DINevfeEnsdTaMnEt NWTETLRLSUSRTEAINLCEST ATE» I DEPUTY CLH11(SUPER10R COURT 
, ., 1, FU!Tt.IN COUNlY GA ) ."~-.~,=< - " 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v. 
LEO F. WELLS, III, et al. 
Defendants, 
-and-
WELLS REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT 
TRUST, INC., 
) 
) Civil Action File No. 2007-CV-139004 
! 
~ ) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER 
Counsel appeared before the Court on February 22,2008, to present oral 
argument on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. After reviewing the record of the case, the 
briefs submitted by the parties on this issue, and the arguments presented by counsel, 
this Court finds as follows: 
I. Facts 
Wells Real Estate Investment Trust, Inc. ("Wells REIT"), a Maryland corporation 
with its principal place of business in Georgia, was a limited term real estate trust that, 
per its Articles of Incorporation, must liquidate or list itself on a stock exchange by 
January 30, 2008. Wells REIT's Board of Directors decided to acquire two of its three 
primary advisors, Wells Real Estate Advisory Services ("WREAS") and Wells 
Government Services Inc. ("WGS"), (hereinafter, the "Internalization") prior to the 2008 
deadline. After the Internalization, Wells REIT amended its Articles of Incorporation and 
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extended the liquidation deadline. Both the Internalization and the deadline extension 
were ratified by separate shareholders' votes. 
This case is a derivative action brought by certain complaining shareholders on 
behalf of Wells REIT that challenges the terms of the Internalization and its related 
shareholder proxy statement, alleges that the Internalization delayed or hindered 
meeting the 2008 deadline, and challenges ongoing advisor services contracts with 
Wells Advisory Service I, LLC ("WASI"). 
The Internalization, which closed in April 2007, was investigated by a special 
committee (the "Internalization Committee"), approved by the Board of Directors, and 
ratified by the shareholders. On August 1, 2007, unidentified Wells REIT shareholders 
sent a demand letter to Wells REIT. On August 14, 2007, counsel for the complaining 
shareholders, counsel for Wells REIT, and counsel for the independent directors met to 
discuss the demand letter. After the meeting, counsel for Wells REIT responded to 
shareholders' counsel with a formal request for additional information and to identify the 
complaining shareholders. On August, 24, 2007, this suit was filed, and shortly 
thereafter Wells REIT's Board' of Directors formed a demand review committee (the 
"DRC") to investigate the demand letter. In October, the DRC issued a report 
recommending that the demand letter be rejected. Thereafter, the Board of Directors 
rejected the demand and filed the motion to dismiss 1 addressed in this Order. 
II. Standards 
A party seeking a motion to dismiss brought under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must demonstrate that plaintiff's 
1 The individual director Defendants moved on October 31,2007, to join in Wells REIT's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
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allegations in the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be 
entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof. Common 
Cause/Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 279 Ga. 480, 481 (2005). 
Defendants seek a dismissal based upon the determination of the ORC to reject 
the demand letter pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-744. See also, MD CODE ANN., Corp. & 
Assoc. §§ 3-203, 2-401 (West 2007). The DRC report, as well as other documents such 
as minutes from the Board of Directors, have been attached as exhibits to the various 
briefs on this issue. In Thompson v. Scientific Atlanta. Incorporated, 275 Ga. App. 680, 
the Georgia Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's order dismissing a derivative suit 
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-744, where a special litigation committee had rejected a 
shareholder's demand letter. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that a motion to 
dismiss, "under these circumstances is perhaps best considered as a hybrid summary 
judgment motion for dismissal. .. " Id. at 683 (quoting Zapata Corp. v. Lamdonado, 430 
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981 ». Thus, the DRC report and other documents related to the DRC's 
review are properly before the Court on this motion. In light of the DRC report, Plaintiffs 
bear the burden of coming "forward with evidence to support [their] claim of lack of 
independence." 19.. 
The internal affairs of a corporation, such as actions involving officers and 
directors, are regulated by the law of the state of incorporation. Diedrich v. Miller & 
Meier & Assoc .. Architects & Planners. Inc., 254 Ga. 734, 735 (1985). Whether or not 
the director defendants breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs and the other Wells 
REIT shareholders is determined in accordance with Maryland law under the internal 
affairs doctrine. 
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III. Adequacy of Shareholders' Demand 
Defendants petition the Court to grant its motion to dismiss on the grounds that 
the shareholders' demand letter was inadequate as a matter of law. Defendants argue 
that the demand letter failed to identify the complaining shareholders and provided 
insufficient factual information regarding their complaints and requested actions. 
Citing Smalcho v. Virkelo, 576 F. Supp 1439 (Del. Dist. 1983), Defendants argue 
that Plaintiffs' failure to respond to their August 8th and 22nd requests to supplement the 
demand letter (identify the shareholders and provide additional factual information) 
before filing suit rendered the demand inadequate. "[T]he identity of the shareholder 
requesting board action is equally important information for the board and the Court 
cannot expect a board of directors to act upon a shareholder's request without such 
information." Id. at 1445 (upholding a trial court's dismissal of a shareholder derivative 
action where the shareholders failed to supplement their demand letter by identifying 
the complaining shareholders before filing suit). 
Plaintiffs in this action, however, filed a verified Complaint on August 24,2007, 
and in the Complaint (Paragraph 82) stated that Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Goldstein, 
served a demand letter on Wells REIT's Board of Directors.2 Cf., Smalcho, 576 F. 
Supp. 1439 (plaintiff's complaint in that case was not verified). In addition, counsel for 
the independent directors represented to the Court that the DRC investigation focused 
on both the demand letter and the Complaint. With the combined information, the Court 
finds Defendants had information necessary to confirm the identity of the complaining 
shareholders for purposes of the DRC investigation. 
2 On February 21, 2008, Mr. Goldstein filled an affidavit with the Court to dispel any confusion regarding 
whether he and his wife were the unidentified shareholders in the August 1, 2007 demand letter. 
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Second, Defendants argue that the demand letter contained insufficient factual 
information for the Board to investigate and act upon. The purpose of a demand letter 
is "to give directors a fair opportunity to initiate the action requested by appellants." 
Bender v. Schwartz, 917 A.2d 142, 154 (Md. App., 2007). 
The demand letter in this case identifies the Internalization and challenges it on 
the grounds that Wells REIT overcompensated the advisors, granted excessive 
employment agreements to certain executives, and continued an advisory relationship 
with WASI. In addition, the demand letter alleges that the Board failed to disclose a 
contemporaneous Lex-Winn offer to the shareholders or to negotiate in good faith with 
Lex-Winn, whom the complaining shareholders allege offered a higher per-share price 
and discouraged the Internalization. Plaintiffs additionally accuse interested directors of 
breaching their fiduciary duties and engaging in self-dealing transactions. The Court 
finds that all of these factors, combined with the August 14th meeting, provided the 
Board with sufficient information to proceed with its investigation. 
IV. Reasonableness of ORe Review 
Upon receiving a shareholder demand letter, a Maryland corporation's board of 
directors "must conduct an investigation into the allegations in the demand" and 
determine whether to pursue a lawsuit. Bender v. Schwartz, 917 A.2d 142,152 (Court 
of Special Appeals 2007). If the board of directors refuses a demand, then the 
complaining shareholder may bring a "demand refused" action.3 .!Q. 
3 The timing of this lawsuit departs from that of a traditional derivative suit. Here, Plaintiffs presented their 
demand letter and then filed the Complaint three weeks later before the Board of Directors had completed 
their investigation or made a recommendation. Because, however, Plaintiffs' demand was ultimately 
denied, for purposes of this section, the Court will evaluate this case as a classic demand refused action. 
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A board of directors' investigation and refusal of a demand is evaluated by courts 
under the business judgment rule because a board's decision whether to pursue 
litigation is treated with substantial deference. A shareholder's suit may proceed, 
however, if the shareholder can demonstrate that either (i) "the board or committee's 
investigation or decision was not conducted independently and in good faith," or (ii) "the 
decision was not within the realm of sound business judgment." Id. (citing Levine v. 
Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 212 (Del. 1991); Scalasi v. Grills, 501 F .Supp.2d 356, 362-362 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007). After making a demand upon a board of directors, the shareholder 
waives claims that the "board cannot independently act on the demand", but, instead, 
must allege that the board "in fact did not act independently .... " Bender v. Schwartz, 
917 A.2d at 152 (emphasis in original). 
A. Independence 
Plaintiffs allege that the following facts demonstrate that the Board did not act 
independently in refusing their demand: (i) the overlap between the Board members on 
the Internalization Special Committee and the DRC, (ii) the Board of Directors' refusal of 
demand in another "factually similar" derivative suit challenging the internalization, 
and/or (iii) the representation of the DRC by the same independent counsel who 
represented the disinterested directors on the Internalization. Plaintiffs argue that the 
Board of Directors was essentially allowed to grade its own homework by allowing the 
same individuals (Directors and independent counsel) who recommended and approved 
the Internalization to review its propriety in the context of the demand letter. 
Three of the Directors on the Internalization Committee also served on the four-
member DRC. Plaintiffs complain that Mr. Cantrell, a newly elected Director, was not 
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put on the ORC. On any board of directors, overlapping committee membership is a 
practical reality. Without more, this alone is insufficient to challenge the independence 
of the ORC's review. See,~, Scalisi v. Grills, 501 F.Supp.2d 356, 362-362 (upholding 
a committee's independence for purposes of applying the business judgment rule to a 
demand refusal); Webowsky v. Collumb, 362 Md. 581, 618 (Md. 2001) (board members' 
participation in underlying transactions did not demonstrate lack of independence 
sufficient for excuse of demand). Similarly, refusing a factually-related demand and/or 
participating in a defense of a factually-related suit is insufficient to establish lack of 
independence. Scalisi, 501 F.Supp.2d at 362-363. 
Plaintiffs' third challenge to the ORC's independence relates to its legal 
representation by Rogers & Hardin, LLP ("R&H"). R&H acted as special outside 
counsel to the Internalization Committee and to the ORC. See, In Re Consumers 
Power Co. Derivative Litigation, 132 F.R.O. 455, 474 (E.O. Mich. 1990) ("the integrity of 
a special litigation committee can be undermined if the attorneys represented and 
advising it have a sufficient conflict of interest to taint the committee's investigation and 
decision-making."). Plaintiffs challenge R&H's dual representation of the Internalization 
and ORC Committees as an opportunity for R&H to review its own performance and 
advice. Plaintiffs argue that for R&H to advise the ORC to take action on the demand 
would have been a criticism of the Internalization Committee's work, which was done 
under the guidance of R&H. 
Retaining the same special counsel to advise the Internalization Committee and 
the ORC, however, does not "taint" the independence of the ORC and remove it from 
the protection of the business judgment rule. See,~, In Re Boston Scientific Corp. 
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Shareholders' Litigation, 2007 WL 1696995 (S.D.N.Y 2007) (upholding the application 
of the business judgment rule to a demand committee's investigation where the 
committee retained the same counsel to advise it as advised the transaction being 
challenged in the demand); Madvig v. Gaither, 461 F. Supp. 2d 398, 408 (W.D.N.C., 
2006) (finding no conflict to retain the same counsel to advise the audit committee and 
who handled the SEC allegations). Practical considerations such as the time and 
money required to bring in new counsel, catch them up to speed, and perform the 
investigation support the conclusion that outside counsel who advised a company on an 
underlying transaction are not necessarily conflicted out of advising a demand 
committee investigating that transaction. 
Plaintiffs also challenge R&H's impact on the DRC's independence because it 
represents the individual shareholders in this litigation. In Re Consumers Power Co. 
Derivative Litigation, 132 F.R.D. 455,474 (E.D. Mich. 1990). In In Re Consumer Power, 
the Court analyzed the existing attorney relationships and found a potential for a law 
firm's involvement to negate the independence of the special investigation committee 
where the law firm represented the interested directors on issues raised in the demand. 
Defendants, however, argue that in this case R&H has been aligned only with the 
independent directors in their capacity as both Board of Director committee members 
(Internalization and DRC) and now as defendants in this case. Defendants argue that 
the conflict opined upon in In Re Consumer Power would be analogous to R&H 
representing the interested directors and the corporation, which is not the factual 
situation before the Court. Without more, the Court declines to find that R&H's 
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involvement in the events giving rise to the law suit and in this litigation negate the 
ORe's independence.4 
B. ORe Investigation, Review, and Report 
Plaintiffs also challenge the sufficiency of the ORe investigation, review and 
report arguing that it was neither reasonable nor based in sound business judgment. 
The reasonableness of a committee review is evaluated by factors such as (1) retention 
of independent counsel, (2) production of a report, including its length, procedures, 
reasoning and supporting documentation, (3) proper identification of the issues, 
investigation/interviewing of officers, directors and/or employees, (4) review of relevant 
documents, and (5) demand committee meetings. Bender v. Schwartz, 917 A.2d 142, 
156. Plaintiffs specifically challenge the ORe review on the grounds that the ORe 
performed insufficient interviews (Le., did not interview the interested directors), 
reviewed an insufficient number of documents related to the Internalization, and failed to 
adequately meet and/or deliberate regarding the demand. 
On August 22,2007, the Wells REIT Board of Directors formed the ORe, which 
was comprised of four independent Directors represented by R&H as outside counsel. 
The DRe held a telephonic meeting on September 7,2007, and in-person meetings on 
September 12th and the 20th, which included presentations from Wells REIT's financial 
advisors. In addition, Defendants state that the ORe reviewed nine binders of 
documents relating to the Internalization including advisor reports and Board meeting 
minutes. Defendants also argue that the ORe's investigation was reasonable because 
it relied, in part, on its familiarity with and investigations regarding the Internalization, 
4 The issues raised by Plaintiffs' counsel in this regard speak more to potential conflicts between multiple 
clients and potential disqualification issues. In light of the facts of this case, however, these concerns 
alone are not sufficient to negate the ORe's independence. 
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including prior investigations in factually similar law suits. See Frank v. LoVetere, 363 
F.Supp.2d 327, 337 ("Plaintiff points to no authority or policy reason why it would be 
unreasonable as a matter of law for the [demand committee] to rely on a knowledgeable 
corporate official's expertise derived from his own involvement with the transaction 
when it occurred."). On September 24,2007, the ORC presented its conclusions to the 
Board and followed up with a 57-page report plus numerous exhibits on October 4, 
2007.5 
In its Report, the ORC concluded that there were inadequate facts to support a 
claim of breach of fiduciary duty, waste of corporate assets, unjust enrichment, or 
usurpation of corporate opportunity. Finally, the ORC concluded that pursuing this 
litigation was not in the best interest of the company because of the expense, disruption 
to business operations, distraction of management, and harm/difficulty in undoing the 
Internalization. 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to 
raise facts sufficient to call into question the reasonableness of the ORC review. In light 
of the Bender factors, this Court holds that the ORC investigation, review, and report 
were reasonable and grounded in sound business judgment. 
5 Plaintiffs concede that the DRe correctly identified and investigated the relevant issues, which were laid 
out in the demand letter and discussed between counsel during their various meetings. 
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v. Conclusion 
For the above stated reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. 
SO ORDERED, this ~ day of March, 2008. 
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